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INTRODUCTION
I would like to express my profound gratitude to Professor
Erik Gerding and the editors of the University of Colorado Law
Review for organizing and hosting the May 2021 conference that
evaluated my scholarship on regulating megabanks,1 and for
* Professor Emeritus of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am
very grateful for the superb research help provided by Germaine Leahy, Head of
Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library. I would also like to thank the editors
of the University of Colorado Law Review for their dedication and skill in editing
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publishing this symposium issue. I would also like to thank the
conference participants and the authors of the Foreword and the
Articles included in this Issue for their very kind comments
about my academic career. I am especially grateful to Professor
Patricia McCoy for her very generous overview of my scholarship
and career in her Foreword. It has been my great privilege and
pleasure to be a friend and colleague of all of the conference participants and authors and to learn from their expert commentaries on financial regulation. I am deeply indebted to each of
them.
Part I of this Afterword discusses the Articles in this Issue
and their relationship to my own work. Part II analyzes the
global financial crisis that was triggered by the outbreak and
spread of the COVID-19 pandemic during the first quarter of
2020, as well as the responses to that crisis by governments
around the world. As shown in Part II, the pandemic crisis confirms that “universal banks” (financial holding companies that
engage in a wide range of banking and capital markets activities) and “shadow banks” (large nonbank financial institutions,
such as private equity funds and hedge funds) pose grave dangers to financial markets and economies around the globe.
The pandemic crisis also shows that the world remains
trapped in a “global doom loop”—a toxic web of mutual dependence that links universal banks, shadow banks, wealthy investors, governments, and central banks. The “global doom loop”
produces continually rising levels of private and public debts,
which promote dangerous boom-and-bust cycles. In turn, those
boom-and-bust cycles require ever-larger bailouts when serious
financial and economic disruptions occur. Accordingly, the goal
of “taming the megabanks”—of both “universal” and “shadow”
varieties—must remain at the top of the agenda for financial
regulators and policymakers.2

this Essay and the other Essays included in this symposium issue. Unless otherwise indicated, this Essay includes developments through December 31, 2021.
1. Colo. L., Regulating Megabanks: A Conference in Honor of Arthur Wilmarth,
YOUTUBE (May 24, 2021), https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLwFq2GLi5UiyIX9OK3fgYZKOK0BtLCbN [https://perma.cc/F332-9H8M].
2. See ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR., TAMING THE MEGABANKS: WHY WE NEED A
NEW GLASS-STEAGALL ACT 12–14, 325–27, 353–56 (2020) (describing the “global
doom loop” and its causes).
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RESPONSES TO ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
A. Jeremy Kress’s Article

Jeremy Kress’s article3 proposes an important and valuable
reform to the corporate governance of financial holding companies. His proposal would reduce the risks posed by nonbank affiliates to banks that are subsidiaries of financial holding companies. As Professor Kress explains, one of the principal reasons
for my opposition to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999
(“GLBA”) was my expectation that financial holding companies
would cause their subsidiary banks to transfer their federal
“safety net” subsidies to their nonbank affiliates. He finds that
my concerns about transfers of safety-net subsidies—including
those provided by federal deposit insurance, lender of last resort
assistance from the Federal Reserve (Fed), and bailouts of “too
big to fail” banks—have been confirmed by events since GLBA’s
enactment.4
Post-GLBA developments have provided abundant evidence
of megabanks’ ability to exploit safety-net subsidies with the
help of Congress and federal bank regulators. The Fed has repeatedly approved exemptions to the statutory limits on affiliate
transactions imposed by section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.
The Fed granted broad exemptions to section 23A’s limits during
three crisis episodes: the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001; the global financial crisis of 2007–09; and the COVID-19
pandemic. The Fed’s exemptions enabled bank subsidiaries of
large financial holding companies to support endangered nonbank affiliates, including securities broker-dealers, money market mutual funds, and securitization conduits. As Professor
Saule Omarova observed, the Fed’s exemptions during the global
financial crisis of 2007–09 permitted “massive transfers of
funds” from large banks to their nonbank affiliates, thereby
“transfer[ing] [the] federal subsidy outside the [banking] system.”5

3. Jeremy C. Kress, Who’s Looking Out for the Banks?, 93 U. COLO. L. REV.
897 (2022).
4. Id. at 898–901, 908–15.
5. Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank: The Unfulfilled Promise of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1683, 1762–
63 (2011); Kress, supra note 3, at 898–902, 911–15, 919–23; see also WILMARTH,
supra note 2, at 174–76, 180–85, 192–93; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The
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Congress authorized further transfers of safety-net subsidies in 2014 when it repealed virtually all of the Lincoln Amendment. The Lincoln Amendment—enacted as section 716 of the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)—required financial holding companies
to conduct most of their derivatives activities through nonbank
subsidiaries. Megabanks vehemently opposed the Lincoln
Amendment because it significantly limited their ability to use
cheap, federally-insured deposits to finance their derivatives
trading operations. The Fed and the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) postponed the Lincoln Amendment’s compliance date for two years, and Congress subsequently gutted
the provision before it took effect. As a result, financial holding
companies are permitted to conduct nearly all of their derivatives activities through their subsidiary banks and can use federally insured deposits to fund those activities.6
In March 2020, the Fed, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the OCC added insult to injury by rescinding a regulation they had jointly issued in 2015. The 2015 rule
required banks to collect margin (collateral) for their derivatives
transactions with affiliates, thereby protecting banks against
the risk of default by their affiliates. As Professor Kress points
out, the federal agencies’ decision to rescind that regulation and
“[e]liminat[e] interaffiliate margin requirements allows—indeed, encourages—financial conglomerates to transfer risk into
their depository institution subsidiaries.”7
Senior executives and directors of large financial holding
companies have strong incentives to transfer safety-net subsidies from subsidiary banks to nonbank affiliates. Top executives
manage financial conglomerates in a highly integrated and consolidated manner designed to maximize their organizations’ total revenues and profits.8 In addition, corporate leaders
Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 446–50, 454–57, 472–
73.
6. Kress, supra note 3, at 929–31; see also WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 302–03,
308–09, 340–41, 463 n.60.
7. Kress, supra note 3, at 929–33 (citing Margin and Capital Requirements for
Covered Swap Entities, 85 Fed. Reg. 39,754 (July 1, 2020)).
8. Wilmarth, supra note 5, at 256, 449–50, 456–57. In his annual letter to
shareholders dated March 15, 2011, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan said,
“We run the franchise for every customer in full, delivering all of the services they
may have traditionally sought separately from a retail bank, a commercial bank,
an investment bank, a wealth management firm, a brokerage or a private bank. We
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encourage investors and the public to rely on the combined
strength of their entire holding companies, including their subsidiary banks and their nonbank subsidiaries. Jamie Dimon,
CEO of JPMorgan Chase (JPMC), explained in a recent annual
letter to shareholders that JPMC’s “fortress balance sheet” is
one of “the basic principles and strategies we use to build this
company”—meaning JPMC’s complete holding company.9 In an
earnings call with institutional investors in July 2020, Brian
Moynihan, CEO of Bank of America (BofA), similarly stated that
“[w]e’ve also improved our fortress balance sheet even from yearend to today,” and “we built this company [to] be adamantine in
all times and [a] fortress.”10
Dimon and Moynihan have repeatedly invoked the “fortress
balance sheet” metaphor to tout the overall strength of their respective holding companies during the past decade.11 To my
knowledge, federal bank regulators have never objected to those
statements or to similar public claims made by CEOs of other
megabanks regarding the consolidated strength of their holding
companies.12 Yet such statements clearly appear to violate section 23B(c) of the Federal Reserve Act. Section 23B(c) prohibits
each FDIC-insured bank and its nonbank affiliates from
serve them on an integrated, customer-focused basis.” BANK OF AM., 2010 ANNUAL
REPORT 2–3 (2010) (emphasis added), https://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/AnnualReportArchive/b/NYSE_BAC_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CYC483FQ]; see also JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 294 (2020),
https://www.jpmorganchase.com/content/dam/jpmc/jpmorgan-chase-and-co/investor-relations/documents/annualreport-2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DN7M-RUVT]
(stating that “the Firm’s operations are highly integrated”).
9. See JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., supra note 8, at 3, 5, 9, 31, 91 (describing the
firm’s “fortress balance sheet” philosophy repeatedly).
10. Bank of America Corporation (BAC) CEO Brian Moynihan on Q2 2020 Results: Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (July 16, 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4358922-bank-of-america-corporation-bac-ceo-brian-moynihan-onq2-2020-results-earnings-call [https://perma.cc/8QV2-HECA].
11. See, e.g., BANK OF AM., supra note 8, at 2 (quoting Brian Moynihan’s annual letter to shareholders, dated March 15, 2011, which states that “[w]e are building and will maintain a fortress balance sheet”); Christopher Westfall, JPMorgan
Defends
‘Fortress’
Balance
Sheet,
STREET
(July
14,
2011),
https://www.thestreet.com/investing/stocks/jpmorgan-chase-earnings-beat-estimates-11184659 [https://perma.cc/HLV9-R6Y6] (quoting Jamie Dimon’s statement
that “[w]e maintained our fortress balance sheet”).
12. For example, William Demchak, CEO of PNC Financial, stated in July
2020 that “our focus right now is to make sure we have . . . a fortress balance sheet.”
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. (PNC) CEO William Demchak on Q2 2020
Results: Earnings Call Transcript, SEEKING ALPHA (July 15, 2020), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4358655-pnc-financial-services-group-inc-pnc-ceo-williamdemchak-on-q2-2020-results-earnings-call [https://perma.cc/X2EX-QLBF].
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publishing any “advertisement . . . stating or suggesting that the
bank shall in any way be responsible for the obligations of its
affiliates.”13 The public statements quoted above by Dimon and
Moynihan strongly imply that the assets of the subsidiary banks
of JPMC and BofA stand behind the liabilities of their nonbank
affiliates as part of the combined “fortress balance sheet” of the
entire financial holding company. The Fed’s failure to enforce
section 23B(c) provides an additional example of its general laxity in implementing the affiliate transaction rules governing financial holding companies.14
Professor Kress points out that the willingness of federal
regulators to allow significant transfers of safety-net subsidies
within large financial holding companies is consistent with regulators’ failure to protect subsidiary banks from the risks posed
by their parent holding companies and nonbank affiliates.15 For
example, regulators do not require subsidiary banks to appoint
independent directors. Common directors that serve on the
boards of both a subsidiary bank and its parent holding company
have conflicting loyalties and are very likely to favor the interests of the holding company at the expense of the bank.16
Professor Kress has assembled a valuable data set that includes the identities of directors of thirteen large financial holding companies (each with more than $100 billion of assets) and
their subsidiary banks. That data set reveals that 78 percent
(119 of 152) of the directors of the subsidiary banks also serve as
directors of the parent holding companies.17 At the two largest
U.S. banking organizations—JPMC and BofA—all of the directors of the subsidiary banks are also directors of the parent holding companies. The CEOs of the two parent holding companies
(Dimon and Moynihan) are also CEOs of the subsidiary banks.18
13. 12 U.S.C. § 371c-1(c). The advertising prohibition in Section 23B(c) applies
to banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and their nonbank affiliates. Another federal statute applies the same prohibition to all other FDICinsured depository institutions and their affiliates. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(j)(1).
14. In addition to the Fed’s frequent approvals of exemptions from sections
23A and 23B, the Fed has failed for more than a decade to implement Dodd-Frank’s
mandate for rules that would impose the requirements of sections 23A and 23B on
derivatives transactions, securities repurchase agreements, and securities lending
arrangements between banks and their nonbank affiliates. Kress, supra note 3, at
911–15, 921–23, 928–29.
15. Id. at 924–33.
16. Id. at 916–20.
17. Id. at 921.
18. Id. at 923.
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Ten other large financial holding companies with over $100
billion of assets do not publicly disclose the identities of directors
of their subsidiary banks.19 Those holding companies refused to
provide the names of directors of their subsidiary banks to Professor Kress, and federal regulators rejected his requests for
such information under the Freedom of Information Act.20 I
agree with Professor Kress that the absence of publicly available
information identifying the directors of subsidiary banks of major financial holding companies should be considered a matter of
great public concern.
To provide better protection for banks owned by large financial holding companies and to reduce the spread of federal
safety-net subsidies, Professor Kress would require holding companies with over $100 billion of assets to appoint independent
directors for their subsidiary banks.21 He would also require
large holding companies whose nonbanking operations account
for more than 10 percent of their assets to appoint a majority of
independent directors for their subsidiary banks. Holding companies would need to give prior notice to their federal regulators
before appointing or removing independent directors. In addition, lead directors and chairs of the risk and audit committees
of subsidiary banks would have to be independent. Independent
directors would also have direct reporting responsibilities to federal bank regulators. Professor Kress’s proposed requirement for
independent directors at subsidiary banks of large financial
holding companies would be consistent with the practices of
other countries, including the United Kingdom and France.22
Professor Kress’s proposal would substantially strengthen
the corporate governance of large financial holding companies
and their subsidiary banks. It would provide important safeguards for subsidiary banks and discourage the spread of federal
safety-net subsidies to nonbank affiliates. A major advantage of
his proposal is that it could be adopted by federal bank regulators under their existing statutory authorities.23

19. Id. at 920 n.111. There are currently twenty-three financial holding companies with over $100 billion of assets. Professor Kress was unable to obtain the
names of subsidiary bank directors for ten of those holding companies. See id. at
936 n.179.
20. Id. at 920 n.111.
21. Id. at 934–39, 941–43.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 939–44.
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Professor Kress acknowledges that the success of his proposal would depend on its effective implementation by regulators. He identifies potential obstacles that could prevent or undermine the implementation of his proposal, including the
enormous influence that financial giants wield within our political and regulatory systems.24 I strongly support his proposal as
a desirable step toward limiting the ability of financial conglomerates to take advantage of public subsidies for banks. However,
my analysis of the financial industry over the past forty years
has persuaded me that only fundamental structural reforms—
including mandatory breakups of universal banks and shadow
banks—are likely to stop transfers of safety-net subsidies, which
Professor Kress has correctly identified as a major problem in
our financial regulatory system.25
B. Heidi Schooner’s Article
Heidi Schooner’s article26 provides a compelling rationale
for an important component of my proposed new Glass-Steagall
Act. As Professor Schooner explains, my proposal would create
three independent sectors in the financial industry by separating banks from the capital markets and the insurance industry.27 In addition to improving financial stability, my proposed
tripartite division of the financial industry would reduce the political power and regulatory influence that giant financial conglomerates currently possess. Separating the three sectors
would “rekindle the heated political rivalries that existed among
banks, securities firms, and insurance companies” prior to the
repeal of the original Glass-Steagall Act.28 Structural separation
would also encourage each sector of the financial industry to

24. Id. at 944 (recognizing that the successful implementation of his proposal
would depend on strong action by federal regulators, despite their past “fail[ures]
to adequately protect depository institutions from exploitation”); id. at 945 (pointing out that “financial conglomerates have had a powerful incentive to exploit their
depository institution subsidiaries and take advantage of federal safety net subsidies” since the enactment of GLBA in 1999).
25. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 13–14, 340–41, 355–56 (arguing that a new
Glass-Steagall Act is needed to “break up universal banks” and “stop banks from
exploiting safety net subsidies to finance speculative capital markets activities”).
26. Heidi M. Schooner, The Role of Rival Litigation in Wilmarth’s New GlassSteagall, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 961 (2022).
27. Id. at 970–72; see also WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 13–14, 335–56.
28. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 348.
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“serve as a strong counterweight against the political and regulatory influence of the others.”29
My proposal is designed to prevent a repetition of the history of the 1980s and 1990s, when federal agencies and courts
issued rulings that opened loopholes in the original GlassSteagall Act and paved the way for its repeal in 1999. To protect
a new Glass-Steagall Act from a similar fate, I have recommended two highly important provisions.30 First, the new statute should stipulate that agency interpretations of its provisions
will not receive judicial deference under the Chevron doctrine
and will instead be reviewed on a de novo basis by the courts.
Second, the new statute should expressly authorize financial
firms to file lawsuits challenging agency interpretations that
could weaken the statute’s structural boundaries. Professor
Schooner’s article focuses on the second component of my plan.31
Professor Schooner highlights the importance of my plan by
linking it to the standing requirements for judicial review of actions by federal agencies.32 As she explains, courts apply a twopart test to determine whether a private plaintiff has standing
to challenge a federal agency’s order or regulation. First, the
plaintiff must show that it has suffered “injury in fact” as a result of the agency’s action. Second, the plaintiff must show that
its claim arguably falls within the “zone of interests” protected
or regulated by the applicable statute. The Supreme Court developed this two-part test in a series of decisions, including several opinions arising out of challenges to federal agency rulings
that expanded the permissible activities of national banks and
bank holding companies.33
Judicial challenges to federal agency rulings expanding the
activities of banks largely ended after Congress passed GLBA in
1999.34 GLBA authorized banks to create financial holding companies that owned a wide array of nonbank subsidiaries, including securities firms, investment managers, and insurance
29. Id. at 349; see also id. at 347–49; Schooner, supra note 26, at 970–71.
30. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 349; see also id. at ch. 7 (describing how federal
agencies and courts undermined the Glass-Steagall Act during the 1980s and in
1999).
31. Id. at 349; see also id. at 159–61, 165–66 (explaining that federal courts
upheld federal agency rulings that weakened the Glass-Steagall Act by granting
extensive Chevron deference to those rulings); Schooner, supra note 26, at 6–11
(discussing my analysis and proposals).
32. Schooner, supra note 26, at 972–85.
33. See id. at 980–85 (citing and discussing relevant Supreme Court decisions).
34. Id. at 985–91.
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companies. By permitting affiliations between banks and many
types of nonbank financial institutions, GLBA greatly weakened
the incentives for nonbanks to challenge agency actions that allowed banks to enter new markets.
Professor Schooner rightly calls attention to the significance
of the Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in NCUA v. First National
Bank & Trust.35 In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the standing
of banks to challenge a ruling by the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA). The NCUA’s ruling broadened the scope
of membership for credit unions and enabled credit unions to
compete more directly with banks. The majority opinion held
that the “zone of interests” test for standing did not require evidence of a specific congressional intent to protect banks or other
financial firms from competition with credit unions.36 Four dissenting Justices argued that previous Supreme Court decisions
had required at least some evidence of a congressional purpose
to protect private parties from the additional competition authorized by challenged agency rulings. The Supreme Court has
not considered the “zone of interests” test in a financial industry
case since 1998.37
As Professor Schooner explains, the dissenting opinion in
NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust highlights the importance
of my recommendation that a new Glass-Steagall Act should expressly authorize financial firms to challenge agency interpretations of the statute.38 Such a provision would clearly indicate
Congress’s intent that the statute protects financial firms from
agency rulings that might weaken the statute’s structural
boundaries. It would thereby enable financial firms to satisfy the
“zone of interests” test for standing to challenge such agency rulings, even if the Supreme Court adopts the reasoning of the dissenters in NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust in future decisions.
Professor Schooner also points out that the ability of private
parties to defend a new Glass-Steagall Act would be strengthened if the statute empowered citizens to file lawsuits challenging agency rulings. A provision authorizing citizen suits would
support the public policies advanced by the statute, including
35. Nat’l Credit Union Admin. v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co., 522 U.S. 479
(1998).
36. Id. at 492–95.
37. Id. at 505–12; see also Schooner, supra note 26, at 983–85 (discussing the
majority and dissenting opinions in NCUA v. First National Bank & Trust).
38. Schooner, supra note 26, at 990–91.
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improving financial stability, reducing systemic risks, and protecting households and communities from the hazards posed by
universal banks and large shadow banks. Such a provision
would also be consistent with comparable statutes that currently
authorize citizen suits to defend important public interests.39 I
agree with Professor Schooner that a new Glass-Steagall Act
should include a citizen-suit provision, thereby enabling individuals to defend the statute’s policies in situations where financial
firms might not be willing to do so.
C. Graham Steele’s Article
Part I of the article by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
Graham Steele40 provides an excellent overview of the “macroprudential” regulations that federal banking agencies adopted
during the Obama Administration to pursue the Dodd-Frank
Act’s goals of making large banks safer and less likely to fail.
Federal banking agencies adopted rules that required large
bank holding companies (“BHCs”) to satisfy enhanced capital
and liquidity standards, pass rigorous stress tests, and prepare
plans for resolving their failures (“living wills”). As Assistant
Secretary Steele explains, those regulations were designed to
force “large BHCs to internalize the risks that they pose to themselves and to society” and to hold “BHC shareholders, creditors,
and executives responsible in the event that a large BHC should
fail.”41
Part II of Assistant Secretary Steele’s article explains how
Congress and federal agencies significantly undermined several
of the Dodd-Frank Act’s important mandates during the Trump
Administration. At the urging of large financial institutions,
Congress passed a 2018 statute that directed federal banking
39. Id. at 991 nn.155–156 (discussing citizen suit provisions in the Clean Air
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fair Housing Act).
40. Graham S. Steele, The Tailors of Wall Street: Against “Regulatory Tailoring,” 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 993 (2022). Graham Steele was nominated by President
Biden in July 2021 and confirmed by the Senate in November 2021 as Assistant
Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Institutions. Kate Berry, Senate Confirms
Former Banking Committee Staffer to Treasury Post, AM. BANKER (Nov. 16, 2021),
https://www.americanbanker.com/news/senate-confirms-former-banking-committee-staffer-to-treasury-post [https://perma.cc/7LKX-FWVK]; Hannah Lang, White
House Nominates Progressive for Treasury Financial Policy Job, AM. BANKER (July
20, 2021), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/biden-nominates-progressivefor-treasury-financial-policy-job [https://perma.cc/4MMB-BCDE].
41. Steele, supra note 40, at 1013; see also id. at 1002–12.
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agencies to “tailor” their regulations under the Dodd-Frank
Act.42 Bank regulators appointed by President Trump interpreted their new “tailoring” authority as giving them carte
blanche to reduce regulatory burdens on large banks.43 Trumpappointed regulators substantially weakened capital and liquidity requirements, stress tests, and resolution planning standards for large banks. They also eliminated margin requirements
for derivatives transactions between banks and their nonbank
affiliates.44 The actions taken by Trump-appointed regulators
“had a cumulative impact that was overwhelmingly deregulatory in nature” and “increased [the] fragility of the banking system.”45
Parts I and II of Assistant Secretary Steele’s article analyze
a number of the regulatory developments that I examined in
Chapter 12 of my recent book. I agree that the rules issued under
the Dodd-Frank Act during the Obama Administration compelled large U.S. banks to increase their levels of capital and liquidity significantly between 2010 and 2016. In addition, Title
VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, which was implemented by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission under the leadership of
then-Chairman Gary Gensler, greatly improved the oversight of
derivatives activities.46
However, I believe that the Dodd-Frank Act did not provide
an adequate response to the deeply flawed structure of our financial system, which was exposed by the global financial crisis
of 2007–09 (“GFC”). The Obama Administration and Congress
allowed universal banks and large shadow banks to maintain
their dominant positions in the financial system, even though
those institutions played central roles in promoting the toxic
credit boom that caused the GFC. The Dodd-Frank Act also did
not establish a credible procedure for resolving failures of universal banks and large shadow banks during a systemic crisis
without relying on government-funded bailouts.47
I agree with Assistant Secretary Steele that the Trump Administration undermined a number of key financial regulatory
reforms that the Obama Administration achieved under the
42. The Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 115–174, tit. IV, § 401(a)(1)(B)(i), 132 Stat. 1297 (2018).
43. Steele, supra note 40, at 1015–17 & n.86.
44. Id. at 1021–23.
45. Id. at 1023.
46. WILMARTH, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 299–305.
47. Id. at 299–300, 311–21.
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Dodd-Frank Act.48 The Trump Administration’s deregulatory
measures were undoubtedly a “contributory factor” that helps to
explain why universal banks and shadow banks could not absorb
the financial shocks and did not counteract the financial disruptions that followed the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.49
As Assistant Secretary Steele correctly points out, the inability
and unwillingness of large financial institutions to stabilize financial markets “necessitat[ed] significant public financial support for the financial system and the broader economy.”50
Part III of Assistant Secretary Steele’s article examines the
“full-blown financial crisis” triggered by the pandemic, which
represented “the first test of the Dodd-Frank framework.”51 During the “dash for cash” by financial market participants in March
2020, universal banks and shadow banks quickly “reached the
limits of their balance sheet capacity to act as lenders and securities market makers, meaning private market participants
were unable to absorb the sudden influx of a variety of assets,
including many generally deemed ‘safe.’”52 Universal banks and
shadow banks proved to be “the ultimate beneficiaries” when
Congress, the Treasury Department, and the Fed bailed out
businesses, financial firms, and individuals who were deeply indebted to those banks, thereby “transferring credit and liquidity
risks from the private to the public sector.”53 The Fed effectively
became the “commercial bank of last resort for the entire economy” by virtue of the federally-guaranteed lending programs
that were established during the pandemic.54
Federal regulators also provided extensive forbearance to
big banks during the pandemic, including reductions in capital
requirements and lenient stress tests. Regulatory forbearance
during the pandemic magnified the “tailoring” relief that large
banks had previously received during the Trump Administration. As Assistant Secretary Steele points out, those regulatory
concessions primarily benefited megabanks, their executives,
48. Id. at 307–11.
49. Steele, supra note 40, at 1023.
50. Id.; see also infra notes 82–92 and accompanying text.
51. Steele, supra note 40, at 1023.
52. Id. at 1024.
53. Id. at 1026–27.
54. Id. at 1032 (quoting Julia-Ambra Verlaine & Liz Hoffman, Banks Could
Prove Weak Partner in Coronavirus Recovery, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 24, 2020) (quoting
Michael Feroli, JPMC’s chief economist), https://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-couldprove-weak-partner-in-coronavirus-recovery-11587743212
[https://perma.cc/AC2G-DN9A]).
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and shareholders. In contrast, regulatory forbearance for megabanks did little to help businesses and consumers who relied on
those banks for credit.55 Loan-to-deposit ratios for big banks remained largely unchanged during 2018 and the first half of 2019
and declined steadily thereafter. The twenty-five largest U.S.
banks reduced their total lending by 8 percent (from $5.9 trillion
to $5.45 trillion) between March 2020 and March 2021, and their
average loan-to-deposit ratio fell to its lowest level in thirty-six
years.56
In contrast, community banks increased their total lending
by 9 percent (from $1.58 trillion to $1.72 trillion) between March
2020 and March 2021. Growth in community bank lending included a $120 billion rise in loans to businesses.57 Community
banks accounted for almost 60 percent of the loans made to small
businesses under the Payment Protection Program (PPP) during
the pandemic, even though community banks held less than 13
percent of the banking industry’s total assets.58
Decisions by the twenty-five largest U.S. banks to slash
their lending during the pandemic mirrored the drastic reductions in lending by the four biggest U.S. banks during the GFC.
During and after both crises, megabanks sharply reduced their
lending to businesses while smaller community banks expanded
their lending. Geographic areas that were primarily served by
big banks experienced much worse economic outcomes during
the GFC and its aftermath compared with areas in which community banks had a significant presence. A major reason for that
difference in outcomes was that community banks were much

55. Id. at 63–65.
56. Id.; Shahien Nasiripour, Big U.S. Banks Cut Loans to Record Low, Again,
as Deposits Jump, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 12, 2021, 11:34 PM), https://www.bloombergquint.com/onweb/big-u-s-banks-cut-loans-to-record-low-again-as-depositsjump [https://perma.cc/H8LZ-R5ST].
57. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Quarterly Banking Profile: First Quarter 2021, 15
FDIC Q., No. 2, 2021, at 17, 18 tbl. II-B, https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/quarterlybanking-profile/fdic-quarterly/2021-vol15-2/fdic-v15n2-1q2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P63R-A7VM].
58. Id. at 6 tbl. III-A, 17 tbl. II-B (showing that community banks held $2.65
trillion of assets in the first quarter of 2021, representing 12.5 percent of the $21.13
trillion of assets held by all commercial banks); Michelle W. Bowman, Governor,
Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Lack of New Bank Formations Is a Significant
Issue for the Banking Industry (Oct. 22, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bowman20211022a.htm
[https://perma.cc/LN744BVW] (describing the performance of community banks in providing PPP loans).
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more reliable lenders to local small and medium-sized businesses.59
I strongly agree with Assistant Secretary Steele’s conclusion
that large banks “failed to absorb the shocks created by the
COVID-19 pandemic–requiring the Fed to intervene through
both emergency lending measures and widespread regulatory
forbearance.”60 He proposes stronger forms of “macroprudential
regulation,” including heightened capital requirements and
more rigorous stress tests.61 I share his view that more robust
forms of regulation and supervision are urgently needed to address the systemic dangers posed by universal banks and
shadow banks. In addition, as described in Part II below, I believe that the pandemic crisis demonstrates the need for fundamental changes to the structure of our financial system.
II. THE PANDEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS CONFIRMS THE NEED FOR
A NEW GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
In August 2021, I published an article analyzing the pandemic financial crisis.62 As explained in that article and summarized below, the pandemic crisis demonstrates that policymakers have not addressed the GFC’s root causes. The reforms
adopted after the GFC left in place a volatile and unstable financial system dominated by universal banks and large shadow
banks. Those financial giants continued to underwrite dangerously high levels of private and public debts after the GFC, based
59. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 344–47 (discussing differences in the lending
performance of big banks and community banks during the GFC and its aftermath,
as well as the economic impact of those differences); JESSICA BATTISTO ET AL.,
SMALL BUSINESS CREDIT SURVEY: 2021 REPORT ON EMPLOYER FIRMS, at ii, 9, 17,
25, 27, 28 (2021), https://www.fedsmallbusiness.org/medialibrary/FedSmallBusiness/files/2021/2021-sbcs-employer-firms-report
[https://perma.cc/PAX2-7FML]
(reporting results of a survey of over 15,000 small businesses, which found that
small banks provided more credit and better services to small businesses during
the pandemic compared with large banks and nonbank lenders); Hannah Lang,
Small Banks Are Dominating the Fed’s Main Street Lending Program, AM. BANKER
(Aug. 19, 2020), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/small-banks-are-dominating-the-feds-main-street-lending-program [https://perma.cc/5N7P-AK4D].
60. Steele, supra note 40, at 1059; see also infra notes 82–92 and accompanying text.
61. Steele, supra note 40, at 1058–59.
62. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Pandemic Crisis Shows that the World Remains Trapped in a “Global Doom Loop” of Financial Instability, Rising Debt Levels, and Escalating Bailouts, 40 BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., No. 8, 2021, at
1, http://ssrn.com/abstract=3901967 [https://perma.cc/6SYY-79GU]. Much of the
analysis in Part II of this Afterword is drawn from the foregoing article.
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on their expectation of future government bailouts. Governments and central banks fulfilled that expectation during the
pandemic crisis by protecting the entire financial system, including short-term wholesale credit markets, large investment managers, and the corporate bond market. The blanket protection
provided by governments and central banks effectively “bankified” the entire financial system, thereby undermining market
discipline, encouraging further asset bubbles, and increasing social inequality.63
The GFC and the pandemic crisis establish beyond any
doubt that our financial system urgently needs fundamental
structural reforms. The centerpiece of those reforms should be a
new Glass-Steagall Act, which would separate banks from the
capital markets and the insurance sector and prohibit nonbanks
from using functional substitutes for deposits to fund their operations. A new Glass-Steagall Act would break up universal
banks and shadow banks, thereby ending their toxic conflicts of
interest, speculative risk-taking, and dangerous influence over
regulators and politicians. It would also create strong structural
risk buffers, thereby greatly reducing the probability that future
financial disruptions would spread across the newly separated
sectors of banking, insurance, and capital markets. A new GlassSteagall Act would provide the most direct and practical approach for ending the destructive boom-and-bust cycles that
have plagued our financial system and economy during the past
quarter century.
A. Universal Banks and Shadow Banks Financed
Unsustainable Credit Booms that Led to the Global
Financial Crisis of 2007–09 and the Pandemic Crisis.
Universal banks and shadow banks promoted massive
credit booms on both sides of the Atlantic during the decade preceding the GFC. In the United States, private-sector debts more
than doubled (from $20.4 trillion to $41.6 trillion) between 1999
and 2007.64 The ratio of U.S. private-sector debts to U.S. gross
domestic product (GDP) increased from 212 percent in 1999 to
288 percent in 2007.65

63. Id. at 1, 4–6, 11–13, 16–17.
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id.
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A similar credit surge occurred in the U.K. and several other
European countries, including Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.
U.K. private-sector debts doubled as a percentage of U.K. GDP
(from 200 percent to over 400 percent) between 1999 and 2007.66
In 2008, private-sector debts exceeded 200 percent of GDP in
Ireland and Spain and 175 percent of GDP in Portugal.67 Universal banks and shadow banks played central roles in financing
the transatlantic credit boom by underwriting hazardous subprime mortgages and other speculative, high-risk debts.
Government debts also expanded significantly during the
decade before the GFC. U.S. federal, state, and local government
debts rose from $7 trillion to $12.2 trillion between 1999 and
2007. In 2007, the total amount of U.S. private and public debts
reached $53.8 trillion, equal to 366 percent of U.S. GDP.68
Worldwide private and public debts doubled (from $84 trillion to
$167 trillion) between 2000 and 2007 and equaled 275 percent
of global GDP in 2007.69 Consequently, the United States and
much of the rest of the world confronted enormous debt overhang
problems when the GFC began in 2007.
Governments and central banks provided unprecedented
support for their financial systems and economies during the
GFC and the Great Recession that the crisis triggered. The total
outstanding amount of emergency assistance provided by the
U.S. government to financial institutions and financial markets
peaked at almost $7 trillion in early 2009.70 Governments in the
European Union (EU) provided nearly €5 trillion of state aid to
their troubled financial institutions and financial markets, and
the EU narrowly avoided a catastrophic sovereign debt crisis.71
Four leading central banks—the Fed, the Bank of England
(BoE), the Bank of Japan (BoJ), and the European Central Bank
(ECB)—established near-zero or negative short-term interest
rates. They also purchased huge quantities of government
bonds, mortgage-backed securities, and other financial assets
under “quantitative easing” (“QE”) programs. Central banks
adopted ultra-low interest rate policies and QE programs to reduce borrowing costs and debt service burdens for governments,
households, businesses, and financial institutions. QE programs
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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produced unprecedented growth in central bank balance
sheets.72 The Fed’s balance sheet grew from $900 billion to $4.5
trillion between August 2008 and December 2016.73 The combined balance sheets of the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB increased
from $4 trillion to $15 trillion during the same period.74
The reforms that followed the GFC did not break up universal banks and shadow banks, even though those institutions
were primarily responsible for financing the toxic credit boom of
the 2000s. The massive bailouts of large financial institutions
during the GFC helped universal banks and shadow banks to
become even larger and more dominant players in global financial markets after 2009. They quickly proceeded to underwrite
another major expansion of private and public debts between
2009 and 2019.75
The lax credit policies of universal banks and shadow banks
enabled U.S. private-sector debts to increase by 17 percent (from
$41.6 trillion to $48.9 trillion) between 2007 and 2019.76 Publicsector debts grew even faster, as federal, state, and local governments borrowed heavily to finance spending programs to mitigate the impact of the Great Recession. Federal, state, and local
government obligations more than doubled between 2007 and
2019, rising from $12.1 trillion to $26.3 trillion.77 In 2019, U.S.
private and public debts totaled $75.2 trillion and topped 350
percent of GDP, not far below 2007’s record level of 366 percent.78
Global debt levels also rose rapidly after the GFC. In 2019,
worldwide private and public debts totaled $253 trillion, equal
to 322 percent of global GDP.79 Leading central banks supported
the rapid growth of global debts by maintaining their QE asset
purchase programs and expanding their balance sheets.80
U.S. and international policymakers expressed strong concerns in 2019 about rising debt levels, particularly for nonfinancial business firms. A majority of outstanding U.S. and global
corporate bonds were rated either at or below the lowest
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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investment grade in 2019, as investors bought riskier bonds with
higher yields to compensate for ultra-low interest rates. Most
non-investment-grade corporate bonds and leveraged loans to
businesses allowed dangerously high levels of corporate leverage
and provided few protections to investors. Officials warned that
mutual funds and other investment managers holding risky corporate debts would be exposed to large losses as well as potential
“runs” by investors if a serious recession occurred.81
B. Bailouts by Governments and Central Banks During
the Pandemic Crisis Encouraged Further Growth in
Private and Public Debts.
The rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic during the first
quarter of 2020 caused governments to close social venues and
order mandatory shutdowns of hundreds of thousands of businesses. Those events set off a contagious financial panic that
paralyzed global financial markets. Markets froze for most government bonds and nearly all private debt obligations, including
commercial paper, securities repurchase agreements (“repos”),
corporate bonds, and leveraged loans. Universal banks were unable or unwilling to act as dealers and market makers for repos,
mortgage-backed securities, corporate bonds, and exchangetraded funds (ETFs). Many foreign banks and other foreign borrowers could not obtain funding in dollars to meet their dollardenominated obligations.82
Market conditions stabilized only after central banks established emergency facilities to support financial institutions and
financial markets and governments authorized massive fiscal
stimulus programs. The size and scope of governmental responses to the pandemic crisis far exceeded similar measures
adopted during the GFC. Congress approved $5.2 trillion of stimulus programs between March 2020 and March 2021—a response that was four times larger than Congress’s stimulus
measures during the Great Recession of 2007–09.83 The

81. Id.
82. Id. at 4, 11.
83. Id. at 4–5; see also Christina D. Romer, The Fiscal Policy Response to the
Pandemic, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Mar. 25, 2021, at 89, 89–90, 94
tbl.1, 97–104.
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pandemic stimulus programs of the U.S. and other countries totaled $16 trillion by March 2021.84
Central banks established emergency lending and guarantee programs that stabilized financial institutions and prevented a systemic meltdown of financial markets. The Fed provided over $50 billion of discount window loans to banks. The
Fed also reactivated nearly all of the emergency lending facilities it used during the GFC to support large financial institutions and short-term wholesale credit markets (including money
market funds, commercial paper, and repos). The Fed used those
restored facilities to provide $35 billion of loans to securities broker-dealers (many of which were affiliates of universal banks),
$440 billion of repo loans, $66 billion of assistance to money market funds and the commercial paper market, and over $460 billion of swap loans to foreign central banks (which indirectly provided dollar funding for foreign banks).85
The Fed cut short-term interest rates to zero and supercharged its QE program by pledging to buy unlimited amounts
of government bonds and mortgage-backed securities to reduce
borrowing costs and debt service burdens for governments,
households, and businesses. The Fed’s QE purchases expanded
its balance sheet from $4.3 trillion on March 11, 2020, to $7.2
trillion on June 10, 2020, and $8.2 trillion on July 28, 2021.86

84. Dario Caldara et al., Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., The Global Recovery:
Lessons from the Past, FED. RSRV.: FEDS NOTES (June 22, 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/the-global-recovery-lessons-from-thepast-20210622.htm [https://perma.cc/4A5A-DEJJ] (“The relatively benign outlook
for the post-COVID-19 recovery may be the result of the aggressive and broad
measures enacted by foreign governments and central banks in response to the
COVID-19 pandemic.”); Kristalina Georgieva, Giving People a Fair Shot–Policies to
Secure
the
Recovery,
INT’L
MONETARY
FUND
(Mar.
30,
2021),
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2021/03/25/sp033021-SMs2021-CurtainRaiser [https://perma.cc/YWA2-5ZTV] (“[G]overnments took exceptional measures
[in response to the pandemic]—including about $16 trillion in fiscal action and a
massive liquidity injection by central banks.”); Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 5–6.
85. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 5–7, 11–12; see also Lev Menand, The Federal
Reserve and the 2020 Economic and Financial Crisis 109–20, 129 fig.8 (European
Corp. Governance Inst. L. Working Paper, Paper No. 518/2020, 2021),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=3602740 [https://perma.cc/J7UZ-8AM5].
86. For information on the growth of the Fed’s balance sheet, see Bd. Governors Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Assets: Total Assets, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS: FRED ECON.
DATA (Dec. 15, 2021), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/WALCL [https://perma.cc/
6SYY-79GU].
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The Fed also stabilized overseas dollar funding markets by opening swap lines with more than a dozen foreign central banks.87
Other leading central banks adopted similar ultra-low interest rate policies and aggressive QE programs. The balance
sheets of the Fed, BoE, BoJ, and ECB expanded from $15 trillion
to $25 trillion between January 2020 and June 2021.88 During
the same period, central bank balance sheets as a percentage of
their home country GDP increased from 19 percent to 34 percent
for the Fed, 27 percent to 43 percent for the BoE, 38 percent to
61 percent for the ECB, and 104 percent to 131 percent for the
BoJ.89
Congress, the Treasury, and the Fed created novel lending
and bond-buying programs to support small, midsized, and big
businesses. As a practical matter, the federal government
avoided the need to rescue large financial institutions by bailing
out their customers instead. The federal government’s indirect
rescue of major financial institutions (through bailouts of their
customers) meant that the resilience of universal banks and
shadow banks was never put to a real-world test in 2020.90
The Fed’s Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit
Facilities broke new ground by empowering the Fed to buy corporate bonds and bond ETFs (a step the Fed did not take during
the GFC). The Fed pledged to buy up to $750 billion of corporate
bonds—a pledge that succeeded in reviving the corporate bond
market.91 The Fed also provided a crucial lifeline to private equity firms and their troubled portfolio companies by expanding

87. Wilmarth, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5, 11; see also
DENNIS KELLEHER ET AL., SHOULD FEDERAL RESERVE CHAIRMAN JAY POWELL BE
REAPPOINTED? 5–6, 12–16 (Better Mkts., 2021).
88. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 5.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 11–12; see also KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 5–6 (“[T]he unprecedented breadth and scope of Fed actions . . . starkly expos[ed] the continuing
dangerous fragility of the financial system . . . . [T]he need for the Fed to bail out
virtually every aspect of the financial system with trillions of dollars of support
cannot be considered a sign of success of the financial regulatory framework and
indeed highlighted the lack of resiliency of the financial and banking systems.”);
Rochelle Toplensky, The Covid-19 Pandemic Hasn’t Truly Tested Banks, WALL ST.
J. (July 13, 2021, 5:55 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-covid-19-pandemichasnt-truly-tested-banks-11626170102 [https://perma.cc/6CLD-PCMW] (stating
that large banks “escaped bailouts [during the pandemic] primarily because their
customers were bailed out instead”).
91. Wilmarth, supra note 62Error! Bookmark not defined., at 5–6, 11–13;
see also Menand, supra note 85, at 103–04, 121–24, 128–30.
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its bond-buying program to include noninvestment-grade corporate bonds.92
The Fed’s unprecedented support enabled U.S. companies to
issue $2.5 trillion of bonds in 2020, an all-time record. United
States nonfinancial business debts rose by more than 9 percent
during 2020 and reached a new peak of $17.7 trillion.93 With
assured backing from the U.S. and other countries, corporations
around the world issued $5.35 trillion of bonds in 2020, another
all-time record. Global nonfinancial corporate debts increased by
over 12 percent during 2020 and reached $85.2 trillion.94
The QE policies of central banks also supported massive
government spending programs, which produced rapid growth
in sovereign debt burdens. In December 2020, government debts
in the U.S. and worldwide climbed to their highest levels since
World War II as a percentage of U.S. and global GDP. Total U.S.
private and public debts increased by 10 percent to $82.7 trillion
during 2020 and reached 385 percent of U.S. GDP—surpassing
the old record of 366 percent established in 2007.95 Total worldwide private and public debts rose by more than 12 percent during 2020 and set a new record of $290.6 trillion, equal to 359
percent of global GDP.96
C. Bailouts During the Global Financial Crisis and the
Pandemic Crisis Have Trapped the World’s Financial
System and Economy in a “Global Doom Loop.”
The GFC and the pandemic crisis have shown that governments, central banks, universal banks, shadow banks, and
wealthy investors are caught in a “global doom loop” of toxic mutual dependence.97 Governments and central banks adopted unprecedented measures during both crises to stabilize financial
markets and rescue universal banks and large shadow banks.
Central banks have implemented ultra-low interest rate policies
and aggressive QE programs since 2008—an approach that has
boosted asset prices and facilitated the rapid growth of private
92. Wilmarth, supra note 62Error! Bookmark not defined., at 13; see also
KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 87, at 15–18, 20.
93. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 5.
94. Id. at 5–6.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 13–14; see also WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 12–14, 325–27, 353–56
(describing the “global doom loop” and its causes).
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and public debts. Universal banks and shadow banks are only
too happy to underwrite the continued expansion of private and
public debts, given the lucrative fees those institutions receive
from arranging credit transactions. Wealthy investors keep
“searching for yield” by purchasing higher-risk assets based on
their assumption that governments and central banks will continue to intervene to prevent financial crises and preserve financial stability.98
For several reasons, the global doom loop poses unacceptable risks to the financial system, the broader economy, and society. First, ongoing QE programs indicate that central banks are
monetizing the rapid growth of government debts. The BoE doubled the size of its balance sheet during the pandemic crisis by
purchasing £450 billion of U.K. government bonds, and those
purchases nearly matched the £486 billion of bonds issued by the
U.K. Treasury during the crisis.99 The Fed bought $2.44 trillion
of U.S. Treasury securities between March 2020 and March
2021, equal to half of the $4.91 trillion increase in the federal
government’s total debt during that period. The Fed’s bond-buying program increased its ownership of outstanding federal debt
from 9.3 percent to 17.6 percent, making it the largest participant in the Treasury bond market.100
Second, the unconventional monetary policies of central
banks since 2008 have increased wealth inequality and encouraged speculative risk-taking by financial institutions and investors. The ultra-low interest rate policies and QE programs of
central banks (1) greatly reduce the returns received by consumers from bank deposits and other low-risk savings vehicles, (2)
encourage market participants to buy more risky, higher-yielding investments, and (3) boost the market values of housing and
other higher-risk assets, thereby producing disproportionate
wealth gains for the richest households (which own the largest
share of those assets).101 Bailouts of financial institutions and
98. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 1, 13–14, 16–17 (discussing the perverse effects of the global doom loop).
99. Id. at 14–15.
100. Id. at 15; Christopher Leonard, The Fed’s Doomsday Prophet Has a Dire
Warning About Where We’re Headed, POLITICO (Dec. 28, 2021, 4:30 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/12/28/inflation-interest-ratesthomas-hoenig-federal-reserve-526177 [https://perma.cc/7QW9-VCMG] (“The Fed
has been encouraging government spending by purchasing billions of Treasury
bonds each month while pumping new money into the banks.”).
101. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 15; see also KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 87,
at 5, 15–22 (contending that the Fed’s emergency measures during the pandemic
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financial markets during 2008 and 2020 have led market participants to believe that governments and central banks will continue to prevent serious financial disruptions and economic
downturns, thereby intensifying the incentives and payoffs for
high-risk, high-reward investment strategies.102
The total net worth of U.S. households increased by $24.5
trillion between March 2020 and March 2021, supported by the
federal government’s bailouts and the Fed’s accommodating
monetary policies. Of those gains in net worth, $18.8 trillion (77
percent) accrued to the richest 10 percent of households. In contrast, the bottom half of households ranked by wealth received
only $700 billion (less than 3 percent) of those gains.103 The S&P
500 and NASDAQ indexes doubled between March 2020 and August 2021, producing investment profits that primarily benefited
affluent households. Additional quantitative evidence confirms
that wealth inequality has risen substantially since 2008 and
accelerated during the pandemic.104
Third, the extensive support provided by QE bond-buying
programs for government spending during the pandemic has
crisis “ignited debt, equity and real estate market booms, while contributing to a
substantial increase in what was already massive wealth inequality”); Leonard, supra note 100 (describing criticisms of the Fed’s monetary policies since 2008 by
Thomas Hoenig, a former senior Fed and FDIC official, who argues that the Fed’s
policies “deepen income inequality, stoke dangerous asset bubbles, and enrich the
biggest banks over everyone else”).
102. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 13–15; see also Martin Arnold, ECB Executive
Schnabel Warns That QE Is Inflating Asset Prices, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/6dd8e765-76e8-44c3-b6a6-d7cc114f3a67
[https://perma.cc/VK7W-BM53] (reporting that Isabel Schnabel, the ECB executive
in charge of market operations, warned that the ECB’s QE bond-buying program
was “inflating asset prices and creating risks of financial instability” by encouraging investors to engage in “excessive risk-taking”); Paul Singer, Investors Piling on
Risk Are Setting Themselves up for a Fall, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/32e000cf-c95a-4940-8985-f67ca6170ae8
[https://perma.cc/9WNS-MC3X] (contending that “the current set of monetary and
fiscal policies in the developed world . . . encourage people to believe that risks are
limited and that asset prices . . . will always and forever be protected by the government,” thereby emboldening investors to “take on more risk”).
103. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 15; see also KELLEHER ET AL., supra note 87,
at 20–22 (describing how increases in wealth during 2020–21 were distributed
among U.S. households).
104. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 15, 24–25 n.107; see also Leonard, supra note
100 (explaining that Thomas Hoenig opposed the Fed’s QE policies because “[q]uantitative easing stoked asset prices, which primarily benefited the very rich. By making money so cheap and available, it also encouraged riskier lending and financial
engineering tactics like debt-fueled stock buybacks and mergers, which did virtually nothing to improve the lot of millions of people who earned a living through
their paychecks.”).
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entangled central banks in fiscal policy and reduced their political independence. By compromising the independence of central
banks, QE policies have weakened their ability to control inflation. The Fed, the BoE, and other central banks lost much of
their independence and credibility during the 1960s and 1970s
when their easy-money policies facilitated massive government
deficit spending and produced high inflation rates. During the
summer and autumn of 2021, many analysts warned that (1)
huge government deficits and extraordinary monetary stimulus
by central banks were fueling higher inflation rates, and (2) political pressures on central banks undermined their ability to respond effectively to inflationary threats.105 Growing concerns
about higher inflation rates were supported by rapidly rising
prices for a wide range of goods and services,106 as well as the
lack of strong policy responses by leading central banks.107
105. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 14, 16; see also id. at 25 nn.110 & 114 (citing
expressions of concern by experts about political pressures that reduced the independence of central banks and weakened their ability to respond effectively to rising inflation rates); Patrick Jenkins, The Dangers of Politicising ‘Independent’ Central Banks, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/f3e14f77-1d244453-ad6b-1654eb0a7a76 [https://perma.cc/9T73-YXRS] (“[W]orries are growing
that central banks will become increasingly instrumentalized by governments. A
decade-plus of ultra-low interest rates has suited governments nicely, allowing
debts to remain manageable even as they have spiraled. Some governments have
explicitly pressured central banks towards even looser policies.”).
106. Chris Giles, Inflation: Is Now the Time to Get Worried?, FIN. TIMES (Nov.
19, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/570e9180-45fb-4157-9727-553c2471c309
[https://perma.cc/9Q7K-HESL] (“With inflation at multi-decade highs in the US,
Germany, and other advanced economies, the subject has shot to the top of the economic agenda . . . . Central bankers are facing criticism that they have lost control.”); Gwynn Guilford, U.S. Inflation Hit a 39-Year High in November, WALL ST.
J. (Dec. 10, 2021, 12:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/us-inflation-consumerprice-index-november-2021-11639088867 [https://perma.cc/6RRU-M5D6] (reporting that the U.S. consumer price index rose by 6.8 percent during the prior year,
“the fastest pace since 1982”); Leonard, supra note 100 (“Inflation is rising faster
than the Fed believed it would even a few months ago, with higher prices for gas,
goods and automobiles being fueled by the Fed’s unprecedented money printing
programs.”).
107. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 16; see also Mohamed El-Erian, The Fed’s
Inflation Miscalculations Risk Hurting the Poor, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/8b3f9d33-974a-4b52-b237-e17e0283550a
[https://perma.cc/VL2T-XA74] (contending that “Fed hesitancy” to address “the inflation threat . . . risks making things worse by de-anchoring inflationary expectations due to the persistence of extremely loose monetary policy”); Stephen Roach,
The Sequencing Trap that Risks Stagflation 2.0, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/99eacd37-a2e0-4c74-b6de-99c1ca7caa70
[https://perma.cc/CJ9X-GWXA] (warning that “today’s generation of central bankers is afflicted with the same sense of denial that proved problematic in the 1970s
. . . [and] the risk of another monetary policy blunder cannot be taken lightly”);
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The Fed finally responded to rising inflation in December
2021, when the Fed announced that it would end its QE bondbuying program during the first quarter of 2022 and begin to
raise short-term interest rates shortly thereafter. The Fed recognized that it confronted “two opposite risks”—inflation could
spiral out of control with relatively small interest rate increases,
or the U.S. economy could fall into recession with more aggressive interest rate hikes.108 Most financial market participants
expected that the Fed would approve modest rate increases totaling less than 2 percent. However, some analysts argued that
the Fed needed to act more decisively to maintain control over
inflation.109
Central banks should not forget painful lessons from past
inflationary episodes, including the Great Inflation of the 1960s
Colby Smith & Eric Platt, US Financial Conditions Remain Easy Even as Fed Pulls
Back on Stimulus, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/2c73b1f4b8c1-415b-8df0-237eff180cb0 [https://perma.cc/UJ9U-NG9H] (“US financial conditions are near the most accommodative on record, even as the Federal Reserve has
begun stepping up its exit from coronavirus stimulus measures in a bid to battle
elevated inflation.”).
108. Nick Timiraos, Fed Officials Project Three Interest Rate Increases in 2022
and Accelerate Stimulus Wind-Down, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2021, 5:45 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/fed-officials-project-three-rate-rises-next-year-andaccelerate-wind-down-of-stimulus-11639594785 [https://perma.cc/2ZSW-WU2E];
see also Smith & Platt, supra note 107 (quoting investment professional Steve
Kane) (“If inflation stays high, the Fed will have to go faster [in raising interest
rates] . . . That’s where financial conditions can tighten very quickly and you could
really upset the apple cart.”).
109. Robert Armstrong, The Fed Still Thinks Inflation is Transitory, FIN.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/024e4598-61cf-4871-89dc0626d71a8c96 [https://perma.cc/AZ5F-J3D3] (stating that the Federal Open Market Committee’s statements during its meeting in December 2021 indicated the
Fed’s view that only “a very mild tightening of policy” is needed to “ensure that
inflation is transitory;” thus, “[e]veryone, from Powell on down, is betting on transitory. If that bet is lost, it’s going to be ugly.”); Kate Duguid & Eric Platt, Traders
Bet Fed Will Not Raise Rates as Aggressively as Forecast, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2021)
(quoting investment professional Tom Graff), https://www.ft.com/content/b16f1969c524-4aba-8560-730ab1ccd511 [https://perma.cc/3RCR-2S43] (reporting that “the
market just doesn’t believe that the Fed will ever get past 1.5 percent” of increases
in short-term interest rates); Leonard, supra note 100 (contending that the Fed’s
unconventional monetary policies “created a money-printing quagmire that the central bank would not be able to escape without destabilizing the entire financial system,” as sharp interest rate hikes would probably “cause stock and bond markets
to fall, perhaps precipitously, or even cause a recession”); Smith & Platt, supra note
107 (stating that “short-term funding markets are pricing a relatively shallow [rate]
hiking cycle” by the Fed, with total rate increases of about 1.5%, and warning that
substantially higher interest rate hikes “could send waves through credit and equity markets”); Timiraos, supra note 108 (describing the risk of a “wage-price spiral” if “inflation stays higher” despite the Fed’s expected rate increases).
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and 1970s. Periods of high inflation frequently cause severe recessions with large losses of employment and household wealth.
Such episodes worsen social inequality because their adverse effects are felt most strongly by ordinary wage earners and lowerand middle-income households.110
Probably the greatest risk of the global doom loop is that its
continued support for the escalation of private and public debts
will trigger a systemic debt crisis comparable to 2008 and 2020,
but with an even worse result. For example, outstanding U.S.
nonfinancial corporate debt reached a record amount of $11.4
trillion in September 2021, nearly twice its level in 2007.111 The
most risky segments of the U.S. corporate debt market—highyield (junk) bonds and leveraged corporate loans—set a combined all-time record of $3 trillion in June 2021, more than double their combined size in 2007.112 A third of the leveraged loans
sold to investors in 2021 were issued by companies with total
debts greater than six times their earnings, a level that exceeded
the maximum limit recommended by federal banking agencies.113
Another risky sector of the U.S. corporate debt market—corporate bonds rated “BBB” (the lowest investment-grade rating)—quadrupled in size from $750 billion to $3 trillion between
110. Leonard, supra note 100; 2 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE, BOOK 1, 1951–1969, ch. 4 (2010); 2 ALLAN H. MELTZER, A
HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, VOLUME 2, BOOK 2, chs. 5–7 (2010); Wilmarth,
supra note 62, at 16, 25 nn.113, 115; see also El-Erian, supra note 107 (“Inflation
will continue to hit low-income households particularly hard. Already, surging food
and petrol prices are taking big chunks out from household budgets.”).
111. Nonfinancial Corporate Business: Debt Securities and Loans, FED. RSRV.
BANK ST. LOUIS: FRED ECON. DATA (Dec. 9, 2021), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/BCNSDODNS [https://perma.cc/LVM9-8LG8] (showing that U.S. nonfinancial
corporate debt expanded from $6.2 trillion in the third quarter of 2007 to $11.4
trillion in the third quarter of 2021); Eric Platt, Alarm Bells Are Ringing Unheeded
in a World Yearning for Optimism, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/1cba68a5-b776-4dcd-9499-14c11638dbba
[https://perma.cc/C3GC-SG6Y].
112. Mayra Rodriguez Valladares, The U.S. Leveraged Finance Market Is at a
Record $3 Trillion, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/mayrarodriguezvalladares/2021/08/10/the-us-leveraged-finance-market-is-at-a-record-3trillion/?sh=7ba4c6777880 [https://perma.cc/D9H2-WTFQ]; see also Eric Platt et
al., Companies Raise Over $12tn in ‘Blockbuster’ Year for Global Capital Markets,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/c656c3da-f5db-41f4-942b1ed6de9c2d60 [https://perma.cc/5XNG-XS39] (reporting that $1.26 trillion of junk
bonds and leveraged loans were issued globally in 2021).
113. Joe Rennison, US Borrowers Breach Loan Limit Guidance at Record Pace,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/67b625e7-87ab-478e-aca1995f150e6b9c [https://perma.cc/GQ6U-36FF].
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2007 and 2021.114 The $6 trillion of outstanding U.S. junk bonds,
leveraged loans, and BBB-rated corporate bonds in 2021 were
more than twice the size of the U.S. nonprime mortgage market
in 2007.115 The reckless underwriting of so many hazardous corporate debts might well have planted “the seeds of the next crisis.”116
As was true when the pandemic crisis began in early 2020,
any significant downturn in the U.S. economy would expose tens
of thousands of heavily indebted businesses to default and bankruptcy.117 Is it likely that Congress, the Treasury, and the Fed
could finance another massive rescue operation for the corporate
debt market, similar to the comprehensive bailout they arranged
in 2020, without triggering a global crisis of confidence in the
federal government’s ability to service its debts and control inflation? As shown in the next Section, many other nations would
face similar challenges if a major financial or economic crisis occurs in the near future.118

114. Robert Armstrong & Robin Wigglesworth, Triple-B Movie: ‘Big Short’
Star Fears for Debt-Laden Companies, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2019),
https://www.ft.com/content/4cdf8792-056f-11e9-9d01-cd4d49afbbe3
[https://perma.cc/UT84-VCRY] (providing a figure for 2007); Samuel Lopez Briceno,
BBB-Rated Debt is Proving Surprisingly Resistant to Covid-19, VANGUARD EUROPE
(Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.vanguardeurope.com/portal/site/institutional/nl/en/articles/research-and-commentary/markets-economy/bbb-rated-debt-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/6UXR-DYGR] (providing a figure for 2021).
115. See supra notes 112–114 (providing figures for U.S. junk bonds, leveraged
loans, and BBB-rated corporate bonds in 2021); WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 249
(stating that the U.S. nonprime mortgage market reached a peak size of $2.7 trillion
in 2007).
116. Platt et al., supra note 112 (describing the dangers posed by rising volumes of junk bonds and leveraged loans); see also Armstrong & Wigglesworth, supra note 114 (warning that the rapid growth of BBB-rated corporate debt was a
“menace to the financial system”).
117. Platt et al., supra note 112; Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 2–6, 11–14.
118. Singer, supra note 102 (“[T]he ability of governments to protect asset
prices from another downturn has never been more constrained. The global $30tn
pile of stocks and bonds that have been purchased by central banks in order to drive
up their prices has created a gigantic overhang. With inflation rising, policymakers
are reaching the limits of their ability to support asset prices in a future downturn
without exacerbating inflationary pressures.”).
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D. The Massive Debt Loads Accumulated by the U.S. and
Other Nations Are Likely to Cause Future Sovereign
Debt Crises.
The federal government and many other governments assumed huge debt burdens to prevent the GFC and the pandemic
crisis from triggering a second Great Depression.119 Those enormous debt overhangs are likely to cause severe sovereign debt
problems when the next systemic financial or economic crisis occurs. As shown by Europe’s experiences during the Great Depression and after the GFC, heavily indebted governments could
lose their credibility in sovereign debt markets and forfeit their
ability to borrow sufficient funds to stabilize their financial systems and economies. Under those circumstances, a private-sector financial or economic emergency would likely become a sovereign debt crisis, and governments would have to choose
between defaulting on their debts explicitly (through a debt repudiation, moratorium, or restructuring) or implicitly (through
a currency devaluation or rapid inflation). More than a dozen
European countries defaulted on their sovereign debts during
the Great Depression, and the Eurozone narrowly avoided a similar series of sovereign defaults after the GFC.120
The U.S. government’s debt burden has grown rapidly during the past fourteen years, due in large part to the huge costs
that federal agencies incurred in dealing with the economic and
social fallout of the GFC and the pandemic crisis. Total federal
debt rose from $9 trillion in June 2007 to $16.8 trillion in June
2013, $22 trillion in June 2019, and $28.5 trillion in June
2021.121 The ratio of federal government debt to U.S. GDP increased from 62 percent in June 2007 to 101 percent in June
119. See Sections II.A and II.B, supra.
120. ADAM TOOZE, CRASHED: HOW A DECADE OF FINANCIAL CRISES CHANGED
THE WORLD 116–421 (2018); Carmen M. Reinhart & Christopher Trebesch, A Distant Mirror of Debt, Default, and Relief (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Rsch. Working Paper
20577, Oct. 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w20577 [https://perma.cc/2CZKPUE6]; WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 97–103, 295–98; Wilmarth, supra note 62, at
16, 25–26, 26 n.116; see also Viral Acharya et al., Lender of Last Resort, Buyer of
Last Resort, and Fear of Fire Sales in the Sovereign Bond Market, 30 FIN. MKTS.,
INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 87 (2021) (describing how the ECB ended the Eurozone’s
sovereign debt crisis by assuming the role of “buyer of last resort” for bonds issued
by higher-risk Eurozone countries).
121. Federal Debt: Total Public Debt, FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS: FRED
ECON. DATA, https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEBTN [https://perma.cc/2JYKCTJF] (Dec. 2, 2021).
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2013, 103 percent in June 2019, and 125 percent in June
2021.122
The rapid escalation of the federal government’s debt load
has increased the danger that other nations and global investors
could lose confidence in U.S. Treasury bonds and the U.S. dollar.
In March 2021, the Congressional Budget Office warned that
projected future increases in the federal government’s debt
would
increase the risk of a fiscal crisis—that is, a situation in
which investors lose confidence in the U.S. government’s ability to service and repay its debt, causing interest rates to increase abruptly, inflation to spiral upward, or other disruptions, . . . such as . . . an erosion of confidence in the U.S.
dollar as an international reserve currency, and more difficulty in financing public and private activity in international
markets.123

Many other countries are also facing potential sovereign
debt crises.124 Between 2007 and 2021, the ratio of government
debt to domestic GDP increased from 66 percent to 98 percent
for the Eurozone, 40 percent to 104 percent for the U.K., and 175
percent to 266 percent for Japan.125 A large group of developing
nations are struggling with severe debt problems after they borrowed heavily to finance their fiscal responses to the pandemic.126 The number of countries with total public and private
122. Federal Debt: Total Public Debt as a Percent of Gross Domestic Product,
FED. RSRV. BANK ST. LOUIS: FRED ECON. DATA (Dec. 22, 2021), https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/GFDEGDQ188S [https://perma.cc/3W46-QST3].
123. CONGR. BUDGET OFF., THE 2021 LONG-TERM BUDGET OUTLOOK 5–13
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2021-03/56977-LTBO-2021.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TW56-4VEU].
124. Ruchir Sharma, There Is No Easy Escape From The Global Debt Trap,
FIN. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/c9e0c2c1-55af-4258-9c9292faa111f41e [https://perma.cc/7VEG-AAAN].
125. Trading Economics, Euro Area Government Debt to GDP, TRADING ECON.,
https://tradingeconomics.com/euro-area/government-debt-to-gdp
[https://perma.cc/RP8H-EJEZ] (showing ratio at the end of 2020); Fraser Munro,
UK Government Debt and Deficit: June 2021, U.K. OFF. FOR NAT’L STAT. (Oct. 27,
2021),
https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/governmentpublicsectorandtaxes/publicspending/bulletins/ukgovernmentdebtanddeficitforeurostatmaast/june2021
[https://perma.cc/W3UJ-SMDH]; Japan General Government Gross Debt to GDP,
TRADING
ECON.,
https://tradingeconomics.com/japan/government-debt-to-gdp
[https://perma.cc/VSJ6-3UDM] (showing ratio at the end of 2020).
126. Ruchir Sharma, The Pandemic Stimulus Has Backfired in Emerging
Markets, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/37e8e350-71a7-
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debts exceeding 300 percent of GDP has increased from none in
the mid-1990s to twenty-five in 2021, including the U.S. and
China.127
China’s worsening debt problems pose a significant potential threat to global economic stability. China’s private and public sectors have borrowed huge sums during the past two decades
to finance massive investments in fixed assets, including real estate developments, industrial facilities, and infrastructure projects. China’s total private and public debts increased from 145
percent to 310 percent of China’s GDP between 2000 and
2021.128 Investments in fixed assets generated 40 percent of
China’s economic growth between 2012 and 2019, but those investments have not created any net productivity gains after
2014.129 During 2021, several deeply indebted Chinese real estate and industrial firms either defaulted on scheduled debt payments or faced a strong likelihood of future defaults.130
4c00-a4de-a5a6ba776bfb [https://perma.cc/TYD9-R9DU] (explaining that emerging
economies that were “big spenders” on fiscal stimulus programs during the COVID19 pandemic have encountered “more trouble, in the form of higher deficits and
debt, which will leave them with less ammunition to fight the next battle”); see also
Jonathan Wheatley, UN Chief Warns of Coming Debt Crisis for Developing World,
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/abcd97d3-fb65-47e5-973a598514f1fd5a [https://perma.cc/99KE-WNG6]; Jonathan Wheatley, Feeble Growth
and Chunky Debt Piles Hold Back Emerging Economies, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/b9164299-5a57-4548-9204-370316f47814
[https://perma.cc/UMH4-HB5F].
127. Ruchir Sharma, Ten Economic Trends that Could Define 2022, FIN. TIMES
(Jan. 3, 2022), https://www.ft.com/content/432d78ee-6163-402e-8950-d961b4b
1312b [https://perma.cc/Y76R-RXLF] (highlighting the “debt trap” faced by many
nations); see also Sharma, supra note 126.
128. Greg Ip, Evergrande’s Struggles Reflect China’s Efforts to Rein in Multiyear Debt Boom, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 22, 2021, 10:12 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/evergrandes-struggles-reflect-chinas-efforts-to-rein-in-multiyear-debt-boom11632319200?page=1 [https://perma.cc/43ZS-EHXV].
129. Id.; James Kynge & Sun Yu, Evergrande and the End of China’s ‘Build,
Build, Build’ Model, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/ea1b79bf-cbe3-41d9-91da-0a1ba692309f [https://perma.cc/B6S2-7Q9Z]; Martin Wolf, The Economic Threats from China’s Real Estate Bubble, FIN. TIMES (Oct.
5, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/1abd9d4b-8d94-4797-bdd7-bee0f960746a
[https://perma.cc/B5S3-P3H5].
130. William Langley & Thomas Hale, Modern Land Becomes Latest Chinese
Developer to Miss a Bond Payment, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/5248fe9d-c7e2-46dc-964a-7b8307183e6b
[https://perma.cc/9YCS-7VUJ]; Andy Lin & Thomas Hale, Chinese Developers Hit
by Record Rating Downgrades After Evergrande Crisis, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/6b96ecba-1534-4b94-b0b1-b18de668f938
[https://perma.cc/9AZQ-RQ3W]; Quentin Webb & Anniek Bao, China Evergrande
Requests Help from Government as Debt Crunch Looms, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3, 2021,
11:24 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-evergrande-requests-help-from-
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China’s economic growth rate slowed during the third quarter of 2021 as government officials imposed new limits on real
estate construction and public and private borrowing.131 Analysts warned that a severe slump in China’s real estate industry
could destabilize China’s economy because real estate construction and related services have produced more than a quarter of
China’s GDP since 2009.132 A substantial and prolonged downturn in China’s economy would have a significant adverse impact on the global economy, because China contributed 28 percent of the world’s economic growth between 2013 and 2018.133
government-after-warning-of-new-debt-crunch-11638545951
[https://perma.cc/M236-GDY2]; Quentin Webb & Frances Yoon, Chinese Junk Bond
Yields Top 25% as Property-Market Strains Intensify, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 8, 2021,
9:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-junk-bond-yields-top-25-as-property-market-strains-intensify-11636371718 [https://perma.cc/AJ3C-34HF]; Wolf,
supra note 129.
131. Thomas Hale, China Cuts Lending Rate as Economic Momentum Falters,
FIN. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/404ba4a1-d25f-42ee-b6026d89e8472d4d [https://perma.cc/D2ZA-RBPY]; Langley & Hale, supra note 130;
Tom Mitchell, Xi Jinping Gambles on Economic Tumult to Cement His Legacy, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 12, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/d4018362-7f61-48cc-931ca4ebc216c10c [https://perma.cc/4LRH-FPEY]; Tom Mitchell & Thomas Hale, Xi
Jinping Undeterred from Structural Shifts Despite China’s Economic Slowdown,
FIN. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/aafca7d3-10a9-41c5-9832f6e199a5c630 [https://perma.cc/9668-6USP]; Quentin Webb & Stella Yifan Xie, Beyond Evergrande: China’s Property Market Faces a $5 Trillion Reckoning, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 10, 2021, 12:07 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/beyond-evergrande-chinas-property-market-faces-a-5-trillion-reckoning-11633882048
[https://perma.cc/ZS8H-LQYH].
132. Harriet Agnew, Evergrande Fallout Could Be Worse than Lehman for
China, Jim Chanos Warns, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/0bf52d39-fd42-408f-aa85-52a4135de312 [https://perma.cc/S7HC-W2QB]; Paul
Hodges, Letter: An End to the China Bubble Would Risk a Minsky Moment, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/bc2d8a9f-baf7-4a25-87a94d8bc57afadf [https://perma.cc/P7ZW-RBEH]; George Magnus, Why China’s Evergrande Debt Crisis is the Tip of an Iceberg, NEW STATESMAN (Sept. 22, 2021),
https://www.newstatesman.com/world/asia/china/2021/09/why-chinas-evergrandedebt-crisis-is-the-tip-of-an-iceberg [https://perma.cc/3AK9-KKY7]; Kenneth Rogoff,
Can China’s Outsized Real Estate Sector Amplify a Delta-Induced Slowdown?,
VOX: EU (Sept. 21, 2021), https://voxeu.org/article/can-china-s-outsized-real-estate-sector-amplify-delta-induced-slowdown [https://perma.cc/S9DY-66HM]; Kevin
Rudd, Xi Jinping’s Evergrande Dilemma has Repercussions Far Beyond China, FIN.
TIMES (Oct. 15, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/d9ce37d7-1999-4fcd-ade364657ea32320 [https://perma.cc/N5LT-S57R]; Alexandra Stevenson & Cao Li, Why
China’s Economy Is Threatened by a Property Giant’s Debt Problems, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 20, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/evergrande-debt-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/RKY3-XMFX]; Wolf, supra note 129.
133. Rudd, supra note 132; Jonathan Wheatley & Michael Pooler, China Property Bust Undercuts Talk of New Commodity ‘Super Cycle’, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 20,
2021),
https://www.ft.com/content/473f5422-e86d-427d-842e-7439647a6a3b
[https://perma.cc/H9QP-3YRP].
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In November 2021, the Fed warned that “financial stresses in
China could strain global financial markets through a deterioration of risk sentiment, pose risks to global economic growth, and
affect the United States.”134
CONCLUSION
Events since 2008 make clear that the world has failed to
correct dangerous structural weaknesses in our financial system
that caused the GFC and contributed to the pandemic crisis. The
global doom loop remains in place, allowing universal banks and
shadow banks to take speculative risks and underwrite rising
levels of private and public debts in reliance on expected support
from governments and central banks. The bailouts of 2008 and
2020 have “bankified” global financial markets by expanding
government safety nets to protect short-term wholesale credit
markets, systemically important shadow banks, and the corporate debt market.135 Those bailouts have also imposed extraordinary financial burdens on governments and central banks,
raising serious questions about their ability to cope with the next
major crisis.
My recent book and article propose a series of reforms to end
the global doom loop and create a more decentralized, competitive, stable, and resilient financial system. The most important
reform would be a new Glass-Steagall Act, which would separate
banks from the capital markets and the insurance sector and
prohibit nonbanks from issuing functional substitutes for bank
deposits. A new Glass-Steagall Act would break up universal
banks and shadow banks, thereby ending their toxic conflicts of
interest, speculative risk-taking, and dangerous influence over
regulators and politicians. It would create strong structural risk
buffers, thereby greatly reducing the probability that financial
disruptions would spread across the newly separated sectors of
banking, insurance, and capital markets. Governments and central banks could protect the stability of the commercial banking
system without being forced to provide comprehensive bailouts
134. BD. GOVERNORS FED. RSRV. SYS., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 8, 60
(Nov. 2021), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stabilityreport-20211108.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WT3-CXDZ]; see also Gary Silverman &
Colby Smith, Fed Warns Ailing Chinese Real Estate Sector Poses Risks to US Economy, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2021), https://www.ft.com/content/fcfe51bc-b7f9-493988f7-2f49892440f7 [https://perma.cc/S3LH-T93T].
135. Wilmarth, supra note 62, at 1–2, 6–7, 13–14, 16–17.
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for the entire financial system. A new Glass-Steagall Act would
discourage excessive growth in private debts during economic
expansions and would also avoid the need for huge governmentfinanced bailouts during economic downturns. It would provide
the most direct and practical approach for breaking the global
doom loop and ending the destructive boom-and-bust cycles of
the past quarter century.136
As illustrated by the essays in this symposium issue and
oral presentations during the May 2021 conference, our financial
system is dangerously unstable and urgently needs fundamental
reforms. I applaud the authors and conference participants for
presenting persuasive assessments of serious problems in our financial system, as well as constructive proposals for reform. I
hope their assessments and proposals will find a receptive audience among financial regulators and policymakers. Our nation
(and, indeed, the world) must not delay in taking decisive action
to replace our deeply flawed financial system with a new system
that will be much sounder, more resilient, and more responsive
to the needs of consumers, communities, and business firms.

136. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at 13–14, 335–56; Wilmarth, supra note 62, at
1, 16–17. My book argues that the structures and activities of universal banks and
shadow banks inevitably create perverse incentives for excessive risk-taking as well
as pervasive conflicts of interest. Those toxic features cause both types of institutions to finance speculative and dangerous credit booms that frequently lead to destructive busts. Accordingly, my book contends that universal banks and shadow
banks should be broken up because they promote harmful boom-and-bust cycles
instead of healthy and sustainable economic growth. WILMARTH, supra note 2, at
1–9, 13–14, 31–35, 46–49, 134–35, 196–97, 230–51, 254–64, 278–91, 317–27, 335–
44, 349–50, 353–56.

